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ABSTRACT
The Self: Your Own Worst Enemy? A Test of the Self-Invoking Trigger
Hypothesis
by
Bradley James McKay
Gabriele Wulf, Examination Committee Chair
Professor of Kinesiology
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
The self invoking trigger hypothesis was recently proposed by Wulf and
Lewthwaite (2010) as the mechanism underlying the robust effects of attentional
focus on motor learning and performance. The hypothesis suggests that causing
individuals to access their self schema will negatively impact their ability to learn
and perform a motor skill. The purpose of the present study was to provide an
initial test of this hypothesis by causing one group of participants to activate their
self schema in a straightforward manner. Participants (N = 32) were assigned to
either a self-activated or control condition and asked to practice a wiffleball hitting
task 50 times on two separate days. Participants returned on a third day to
perform a retention and transfer test without the self-activating manipulation.
Results indicated that the self-activated group learned the hitting task less
effectively than controls. The findings reported here provide initial support for the
self-invoking trigger hypothesis and future research directions are discussed.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The role of an individual’s focus of attention has been studied for over a
decade and the results have been consistent: practicing and performing motor
skills with an ―external focus of attention,‖ that is, with a focus on the effect of the
movement, is superior to practicing and performing with an internal focus, or a
focus on the effectors of the movement. Recently, the ―self-invoking trigger‖
hypothesis was proposed as a possible explanation for the robust focus of
attention effect in motor learning. Wulf and Lewthwaite (2010) suggested that
the mere reference of a body part may be enough to activate one’s self-schema,
a potentially malignant cognitive process for motor skill acquisition and
performance. Indeed, self-focused attention has long been acknowledged as a
hindrance to successful skilled motor performance (Baumeister, 1984), and
motor learning (Wulf, Höß, & Prinz, 1998). One can confidently infer that selfconsciousness (self-focus) involves self-schema activation, but the question
remains if self-activation alone will cause the detrimental effects on motor
performance associated with self-focused attention. This is not a trivial issue;
while self-focused attention has typically been manipulated by giving specific
verbal instructions, self-activation can be caused (usually unintentionally) by
various factors (Van Dyck, Van Hooft, De Gilder, & Liesveld, 2010). The self
concept is a ubiquitous network of thoughts, ideas, definitions, emotions, and
possessions that underlies daily existence for most people (Strauman & Higgins,
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1993). Effects associated with such an overarching phenomenon will be relevant
across the motor learning and control theoretical landscape.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of the proposed study will be to test the ―self-invoking trigger‖
hypothesis in a straightforward manner. I intend to cause self-schema activation
in the experimental participants by having them reflect and write about
themselves prior to the acquisition of a motor skill. I will compare the motor
learning of self-schema-activated participants to participants in a control group
whose self-schemas were not intentionally activated.
In line with the predictions originally posited by Wulf and Lewthwaite (2010), I
propose two hypotheses in the present study:
Research Hypotheses
Hypothesis #1: Participants who engage in a self-activating task (writing about
themselves) will learn a modified baseball hitting task less effectively than
controls.

Hypothesis #2: Participants in the self condition will report higher levels of
cognitive and somatic self-activation, and will demonstrate greater signature size
growth than controls.
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Significance of the Study
The present study is significant for at least two reasons. First, this study is
the first to test the ―self-invoking trigger‖ hypothesis directly. Although the ―selfinvoking trigger‖ fits the available evidence well, no study to date has directly
examined its predictions. Second, because the ―self-invoking trigger‖ can
potentially explain a wide range of findings in motor learning and performance
literature, this initial test of its predictions will provide foundational evidence on
which future studies will build. The ―self-invoking trigger‖ may have been
suggested as an explanation for focus of attention effects originally, but its
relevance extends well beyond the focus of attention literature into areas of
inquiry ranging from augmented feedback (e.g., Winstein & Schmidt, 1990) to
conceptions of ability (Wulf & Lewthwaite, 2009).
As previously mentioned, the self is an ever-present, in many ways
inescapable cognitive schema possessed by all motor learners. Determining the
effect (if any) of self-schema activation will serve both theory and practice.
Regarding theory, the ―self-invoking trigger‖ offers a unified explanation for the
benefits of an external focus of attention (Wulf, 2007), analogies (e.g., Liao &
Masters, 2008), and implicit learning strategies (e.g., Poolton, Masters, &
Maxwell, 2005). For coaches, therapists, and trainers, the ―self-invoking trigger‖
describes a primary obstacle to effective learning and offers successful strategies
(such as the ones named above) for avoiding self-activation during skill
acquisition and performance.
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Definition of Terms
The following definitions are given for the purpose of clarification:
External focus
A focus of attention that is directed to the outside of the body, specifically on
the effect or outcome of the movement.
Internal focus
A focus of attention directed at one’s body movement.
Motor Learning
A relatively permanent change in motor performance as a result of experience
with a task over time.
Retention
The performance of a skill subsequent to a period of practice in the absence
of instruction, augmented feedback, or any experimental manipulation that
was present during practice.
Self-schema
Conceptually defined as a functional network in the brain that represents
both ownership and agency. That is, the neural circuitry that codes for
things belonging or referring to one’s self, and to activities endorsed or
controlled by one’s self.
Transfer of learning
The degree to which performance improvements generalize to
unpracticed, but related skills.
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CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
Self-Invoking Trigger Hypothesis
Recently, Wulf and Lewthwaite (2010) proposed a novel hypothesis that may
unite diverse motor learning and performance findings under a common
framework. Wulf and Lewthwaite suggest that aspects of the practice
environment, for example instructions provided by a coach, may cause the
learner to access their self-schema, which in turn may degrade skill learning. In
this perspective, environmental cues that cause self-activation are referred to as
―self-invoking triggers.‖ Self-invoking triggers may be present in coaching
instructions (e.g., internal-focus instructions), augmented feedback (e.g.,
exposure to performance errors), contextual cues (e.g, presence of others or a
video camera), stereotype threats (e.g., race or gender-relevant stereotypes
about a skill), personal characteristics (e.g., an entity-based conception of
ability), perceptions of ability (e.g., low outcome expectancies, low self-efficacy),
and practice design (e.g., blocked practice). Given the myriad potential selfinvoking triggers in typical practice environments and the ubiquitous nature of the
―self‖ in general, the self-invoking trigger hypothesis could provide a
parsimonious explanation of motor learning and performance degradation.
Wulf and Lewthwaite (2010) propose two potential etiological mechanisms of
the hypothesized self-invoking trigger effect: competition for cognitive resources,
and increased self-regulation leading to conscious control of movements. A
competition for resources may occur if attention is divided between the motor
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task and the self (i.e., self-evaluation of performance, self-monitoring of
movements, thoughts about the self that are unrelated to the performance at all).
Additionally, self-regulatory processes may be triggered, particularly in response
to performance errors (Van Dyck et al., 2010), which may impact performance by
creating a competition for resources or by leading to conscious control of
movements. Numerous studies have shown that distracting participants (which
causes a competition for resources) while they learn a task reduces skill
acquisition (e.g., McMahon & Masters, 2002). One study found that distracting a
monkey during motor learning greatly reduced the neural representation of the
task, relative to non-distracted monkeys (Gilbert, Sigmen, & Crist, 2001).
Further, conscious control of movements has been demonstrated to degrade
motor performance in multiple studies and research paradigms (e.g., Baumeister,
1984; Wulf, Höß, & Prinz, 1998; for a review of a decade of research on the
subject: Wulf, 2007).
Focus of Attention
The effect of focus of attention on motor learning and performance has been
examined in over a decade of research (Wulf, 2007). The divergent effects of
internal (focus on the effector of a movement) versus external (focus on the
effect of a movement) foci of attention seem to be robust phenomena, with nearly
all of the evidence suggesting that an internal focus degrades learning and
performance, while an external focus enhances it (Wulf, 2007).
To explain the effects of focus of attention, Wulf and others (Wulf, McNevin, &
Shea, 2001) have proposed the ―constrained action hypothesis.‖ According to

6

this view, an internal focus of attention ―constrains‖ the motor system, interfering
with what would otherwise be more efficient, automatic movement. According to
this hypothesis, the benefit of an external focus is that it prevents the learner
from interfering with said automatic functioning. In other words, an external focus
is advantageous because it prevents an internal focus, and the more effectively
external foci can prevent internal focusing (i.e., by being more distal to the
performer), then the more advantageous the foci are (Bell & Hardy, 2009;
McNevin, Shea, & Wulf, 2003).
The ―constrained action hypothesis‖ is supported by numerous lines of
evidence. For example, adopting an internal focus has resulted in increased
electromyography (EMG) in activities like bicep curls (e.g., Vance, Wulf, Töllner,
McNevin, & Mercer, 2004), free throw shots (e.g., Zachry, Wulf, Mercer, Bezodis,
2005), and dart throwing (e.g., Lohse, Sherwood, & Healy, 2010). This increase
in EMG resulted in a decrease in performance and has been interpreted as
representing inefficient muscle recruitment and coordination. Additional evidence
for the constrained action hypothesis comes from the analysis of movement
adjustments in balancing tasks. Learners who adopted an internal focus were
slower to correct deviations from the horizontal in a balancing task, and also
made larger-amplitude and lower-frequency corrections, relative to externally
focusing participants (e.g., Wulf, McNevin, & Shea, 2001). Making faster
corrections of smaller amplitude during a balance task is indicative of more
automatic, reflexive performance, rather than the consciously controlled, longloop corrections that tend to be slower and larger.
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In addition to the behavioral evidence reviewed above, imaging studies have
examined changes in brain activity when participants perform novel tasks, welllearned (automatic) tasks, and well-learned tasks with an internal focus
(Jueptner, Stephan, Frith, Brooks, Frackowiak, & Passingham, 1997; Wu,
Kansaku, & Hallett, 2004). As tasks became automatic, there was a reduction of
activity in several cortical regions, most interestingly prefrontal (PFC) and
anterior cingulate cortices (ACC) (Jueptner et al., 1997; Wu et al., 2004). When
instructed to attend to their actions while performing a well-learned task,
activation increased in ACC and PFC structures, a pattern of activity that
resembled neural functioning during practice of a novel task (Jueptner et al.,
1997). These neural correlates of internally focused attention provide some
support for the ―constrained action hypothesis.‖ Increased activity in the PFC
might represent a break from automatic processes and the adoption of
conscious, ―noisy,‖ intentional control strategies that constrain the efficient
functioning of the motor system.
While evidence for the ―constrained action hypothesis‖ seems to abound, the
explanation for the focus of attention effects does have important theoretical
limitations. Most importantly, the ―constrained action hypothesis‖ is somewhat
limited in its scope of explanation. It is a ―theory‖ that explains only one
phenomenon. Few, if any, predictions can be derived from the ―constrained
action hypothesis‖ other than the effects of attentional foci. Thus, there is still
need for a theoretical explanation of focus of attention that can spawn new
predictions and explain a broader range of phenomena.
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There is support for the notion that an internal focus of attention leads to a
competition for cognitive resources. Wulf and colleagues (2001) reported that
participants who performed a balancing task with an internal focus of attention
had longer reaction times to a probe reaction time task they performed
concurrently with the balance task. This indicates that performers who were
focusing externally required less attentional resources to perform the balance
task, allowing more resources for the probe reaction time task.
One implication of the ―self-invoking trigger‖ hypothesis is that access to the
self can have a detrimental effect on expert performance as well as on skill
acquisition. One hallmark of expertise is that experts require less cognitive
resources to perform their skills than do novices. For example, a series of
experiments conducted by Gray (2004) demonstrated that requiring novice hitters
to perform an extraneous dual-task (attend to the frequency of tones) while
performing a baseball hitting simulation degraded their performance, while the
performance of experts was unaffected by performing the dual-task. However,
when the experts demonstrated sub-par performance, they simultaneously
demonstrated improved performance on a dual-task that required them to track
their bat as they attempted to hit simulated pitches. Thus, it seems that
increased self-awareness can negatively impact performance, even in experts.
Indeed, an internal focus of attention has also been demonstrated to degrade
expert performance (Stoate & Wulf, 2009), and these related findings may be
explained by the ―self-invoking trigger‖ hypothesis.
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While the self-invoking trigger provides a plausible account of focus of
attention effects, its real compliment to the ―constrained-action hypothesis‖ is its
ability to explain other findings in motor learning. For example, Van Dyck and
colleagues (Van Dyck, Van Hooft, De Gilder, & Liesveld, 2010) found that errors
during performance can lead to self-focus, but the effect is apparently moderated
by underlying conceptions of ability (COA) and goal orientations. In light of these
findings, it seems possible that results from augmented feedback studies may be
explained by the self-invoking trigger. For example, a common finding is that
learners benefit from reduced knowledge of results (KR) during acquisition (e.g.,
Winstein & Schmidt, 1990). Further, learners’ performance on the trials that they
receive KR after is important. Wulf and Chiviacowsky (2007) found that learning
was enhanced by providing KR feedback after successful trials rather than poor
trials. This pattern of results can be explained by the self-invoking trigger: A
reduction in frequency of KR means that learners do not see as many errors as
they would during 100% KR practice. Further, by providing KR only after the
most successful trials, the experience of errors is greatly attenuated for the
learner. Since errors can lead to self activation, it seems that the KR literature is
consistent with the tentative predictions of the self-invoking trigger hypothesis.
Another finding of Van Dyck et al. (2010) that is consistent with the selfinvoking trigger hypothesis is the moderating effect of COA. Individuals termed
―incremental theorists,‖ people who believe that skill is acquirable and their ability
is malleable, are less likely to become self-activated than those termed ―entity
theorists,‖ people who believe that skill is reflective of inherent aptitude. Wulf
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and Lewthwaite (2009) found that by inducing an ―incremental theory‖ of ability in
learners it was possible to enhance skill acquisition relative to controls and those
induced to have an ―entity theory‖ of ability.
It seems then that access to the self may be a common denominator in a
variety of findings in motor learning. Not only can it potentially explain the focus
of attention results, it may also explain results in seemingly unrelated paradigms.
While the self-invoking trigger hypothesis seems plausible, it is currently just
speculation. There has yet to be a single study aimed at directly testing its
predictions, which is the goal of the current proposal.
In order to determine the plausibility of the self-invoking trigger hypothesis, it
is necessary to establish a causal role of self-schema activation in motor learning
degradation. To do so, I propose activating the self-schema in a straightforward
manner that has not been previously examined in motor learning literature.
Further, to test for a mediating role of self-schema activation in learning
degradation, I intend to measure access to the self with both an explicit and
implicit measure. The explicit measure, adopted from Bagozzi, Verbeke and
Gavino (2003), is a questionnaire designed to assess self-focused attention
during performance. The implicit measure will compare pre-test signature size
(on the informed consent) with signature size measured each day on a postexperimental session document. The signature size measure has been used
successfully in the past to assess self-activation and self-esteem compensation
(Rudman, Dohn, & Fairchild, 2007; Stapel & Blanton, 2004). Signature size
measures automatic, nonreactive processes; that is, participants are unaware
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they are providing data when they sign their names and therefore have no selfpresentation motives. If an intervention designed to induce self-schema
activation in learners results in reduced motor learning and increased access to
the self, the currently speculative ―self-invoking trigger‖ hypothesis will be
supported and subsequent investigation will be necessary.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODS
Participant Characteristics
Thirty-two undergraduate students (16 men, 16 women) with a mean of 8years previous baseball or softball experience (SD = 5.87) participated in this
study. The participants had not played organized baseball or softball for at least
one year prior to participation in the study. The participants were assigned to
groups based on gender and years of experience. The control (M = 8.06, SD =
6.01) and self (M = 7.93, SD = 5.74) groups did not differ on years of experience,
t (30) = .06, p = .95.
Instrumentation
Explicit Self-Activation
The self-focused attention measure developed by Bagozzi, Verbeke, and
Gavino (2003) has been adapted to measure cognitive self-activation in the
present study. The questionnaire measured aspects of self-activation related to
self-awareness (e.g., “I think the experimenter scrutinizes my every move and
pays attention to every detail‖), and threat to the self (e.g., “I think that the
experimenter considers me to be a failure as a hitter‖). The full measure can be
found in Appendix I. Four questions from the Somatic Anxiety Questionnaire
(DeGood & Tait, 1987) and one question from the physiological symptoms subscale of the self-focused attention measure discussed above were combined to
form a measure of somatic self-activation. The questionnaire measured the
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somatic manifestation of self-activation (e.g., ―I felt tense in my stomach‖). The
full measure can be found in Appendix II.
Implicit Self-Activation
Signature size, a measure first validated by Zweigenhaft and Marlowe (1973),
was measured by drawing the smallest possible rectangle around the pre-test
and post-experimental session signatures. The pre-test signature was taken
from the original informed consent form, then at the end of each day participants
were asked to sign identical consent forms to measure any changes in signature
size. The area of the rectangle was ascertained by multiplying its height and
width (in mm), and the percent change between pre-experiment and postexperimental session was analyzed.
Hitting Performance
Participants’ hitting performance was measured based on where each ball
was hit, if it all. The task was performed in a converted racquetball court that
was dived into zones. Each hit was given a score depending on which zone the
ball hit first. Pitches that were swung at and missed received a score of 0.
Pitches that were fouled off received a 1. Forward moving hits that struck the
floor within 20 feet of the participant received a 2. Forward moving hits that
landed past the initial 20-foot zone but did not reach the far wall (35 feet from the
hitter) in the air received a 3. Forward hits that contact the far wall below a line 10
feet from the ground received a score of 4. Hits that struck the far wall above the
10-foot line received a 5. Balls that hit the ceiling were judged by the zone they
struck first. Lines on the walls demarcated where the foul line first hit the side
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wall, and rose vertically to a height proportional to the 10-foot line on the far wall.
Balls that hit the side wall between the initial foul line (10-feet from the hitter) and
the 20-foot line were awarded a 3 for striking below the proportional line, and a 4
for striking above it. Hits that passed the 20-foot line and struck the side walls
were scored identical to hits that struck the far wall. A small door frame behind
the area representing home plate served as an indication of ―hittable pitches.‖
Balls that struck outside the door frame and were swung at and missed were not
counted in the analysis and the hitters were allowed an extra swing in that trial
block. This occurred very infrequently.
Collection of the Data
Prior to the practice stage of the study, participants completed a 10-trial
warm up to acclimatize to the task. This warm-up block was initially intended to
serve as a pre-test of hitting performance; however, there were qualitative
changes in performance from the warm-up block to the first practice block
observed by the experimenter, so it was decided that the first practice block
would serve as a better indication of initial ability at the task. Indeed, while the
first practice block was significantly related to all subsequent performance, the
warm-up block was not, F (1, 29) = 1.34, p = .256.
The practice stage of the experiment consisted of two sessions on
separate days. The hitting task required participants to hit golf ball-sized
wiffleballs with a HitMaster GroBat (Sports Products Consultants, San Diego, CA)
that was 32 inches in length and 1 inch in diameter. The balls were pitched at
approximately 25 miles per hour by a Personal Pitcher pitching machine (Sports
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Products Consultants, San Diego, CA). Participants completed 50 swings per
session, taking a break after every 10 swings to complete the experimental
manipulation. Participants were instructed that they did not have to swing at
every pitch, so it was 10 swings – not pitches – that constituted one block of
practice (the groups did not differ on number of pitches taken, t (30) = .583, p =
.564).
Between trial blocks, participants in the self-activated group were asked to
write continuously for one minute about their experience with baseball or softball,
their personal attributes as an athlete, emotional experiences related to baseball
or softball, and strengths and weaknesses as a hitter (see Appendix III).
Subsequent to each period of writing, the experimenter read what the selfactivated participants wrote to increase the self-activating effect of the
manipulation. Control participants wrote for the same length of time and were
given the task of ordering the objects in the laboratory by various qualities including size and color (see Appendix IV). Participants in each group completed
item one from their respective questionnaire following the first practice block of
each day, then item two, three, and four after the next four blocks. Following
each practice session participants in both groups completed the implicit selfactivation (first) and explicit self-activation measures (second).
On a third day, retention and a transfer tests were conducted. The
retention test consisted of 50 swings with rest periods after every 10 swings.
There was no writing task during retention. The transfer task consisted of 20
swings at balls traveling at approximately 35 miles per hours. Following retention
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and transfer tests participants completed the implicit (first) and explicit (second)
self-activation measures.
Data Analysis Methods
Practice data were analyzed in a 2 (group) x 9 (trial block) analysis of
covariance (ANCOVA) with repeated measures on the second factor and initial
performance (practice block one) included as a covariate. Retention data were
analyzed in a 2 (group) x 5 (trial block) ANCOVA with repeated measures on the
second factor and initial performance included as a covariate. Transfer data
were analyzed in a 2 (group) x 2 (trial block) ANCOVA with repeated measures
on the second factor and initial performance included as a covariate. To test the
effect of the experimental manipulation on measures of implicit and explicit selfactivation, separate mixed 2 (group) x 2 (day) ANOVAs with repeated measures
on the second factor were conducted on each measure during practice, while
separate independent t-tests were conducted on each measure during retention.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
Practice
Hitting Performance
Both groups showed improvement in hitting performance across the nine
practice blocks while controlling for initial performance on the first practice block
(Figure 1). The control group tended to perform more effectively during the
practice phase of the study. The main effect of practice block, F (8, 232) = 2.553,
p = .01, partial η² = .08, was significant. The main effect of group just failed to
reach conventional significance levels, F (1, 29) = 4.02, p = .054, partial η² = .12.
Initial performance was linearly related to, and accounted for a great deal of the
variance in practice performance, F (1, 29) = 33.20, p < .001, η² = .53, and was
thus included in the model as a covariate. The Group x Trial block interaction
was not significant, F (8, 232) < 1.
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Figure 1. Estimated marginal means of hitting performance during practice,
retention, and transfer.

Explicit Self-Activation
Both groups reported less cognitive self-activation on the second day of
practice than on the first (Figure 2). In general, it appeared that the self group
reported greater self-activation on both days. The main effect of day was
significant, F (1, 30) = 31.99, p < .001, η² = .52. The main effect of group did not
reach conventional levels of significance, F (1, 30) = 2.23, p = .15. There was no
Group x Day interaction, F (1, 30) < .1.
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Day 1

40

Day 2
Day 3

Cognitive Self-Activation

30

20

10

0
Control

Self

Group

Figure 2. Mean cognitive self-activation scores on days one, two, and three.

Similarly, both groups reported less somatic self-activation on day 2 than on
day one. The control group (Day 1: M = 16.06, SD = 4.09; Day 2: M = 13.38, SD
= 4.47) tended to report greater somatic self-activation on both days, relative to
the self group (Day 1: M = 14.74, SD = 5.62; Day 2: M = 10.81, 5.46). The main
effect of day was significant, F (1, 30) = 17.90, p < .001, η² = .37. The main
effect of group failed to reach significance, F (1, 30) = 1.53, p = .23. There was
no Group x Day interaction, F (1, 30) < 1.
20

Implicit Self-Activation
Signature size change did not appear to differ between control and self
conditions (see Table 1). The main effect for day, F (1, 30) < 1, and for group, F
(1, 30) < 1, were not significant. There was no Group x Day interaction, F (1, 30)
< 1.

Table 1
Group

Control
Self

Signature Size Percent Change
Signature size
change day 1

Signature size
change day 2

Signature size change
day 3

8.46 (30.25)
17.41 (48.99)

11.09 (43.12)
20.66 (52.53)

10.16 (41.77)
21.11 (41.41)

Standard deviations in parentheses.

Retention and Transfer
Hitting Performance
On a retention test with no writing manipulation, the control group tended to
outperform the self group on the hitting task while controlling for initial
performance. The main effect of group was significant, F (1, 29) = 4.642, p = .04,
partial η² = .14. The main effect of trial block was significant, F (4, 116) = 2.57, p
= .041, partial η² = .08, and the Group x Trial Block interaction approached
significance, F (4, 116) = 2.38, p = .056, partial η² = .08. Post-hoc analysis
revealed that the control group did not increase performance across trial blocks
during retention, F (4, 56) = .272, p = .90, while the self group showed a
significant improvement in performance across retention trial blocks, F (4, 56) =
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4.09, p = .006, partial η² = .23. Initial practice performance was linearly related to
retention performance, F (1, 29) = 7.18, p = .012, partial η² = .20, and was
therefore included in the model as a covariate.
The control group tended to perform more effectively on a transfer test that
required participants to hit balls pitched at a faster velocity (Figure 1). The main
effect of trial block, F (1, 29) = .585, p = .45, and the Trial Block x Group
interaction, F (1, 29) = 1.43, p = .24, we both non-significant. The main effect of
group, F (1, 29) = 3.20, p = .084, failed to reach significance. Initial performance
was linearly related to transfer test performance, F (1, 29) = 7.64, p = .01, partial
η² = .21, and was therefore included in the model as a covariate.

Explicit Self-Activation
The self group (M = 25.94, SD = 8.07) reported slightly higher cognitive selfactivation on day three than the control group (M = 22.38, SD = 8.38), but this
difference was not significant (t (30) = 1.22, p = .23).
The control group reported higher somatic self-activation on day three (M =
15.25, SD = 4.71) than the self group (M = 11.44, SD = 5.34). The difference
between groups on somatic self-activation was statistically significant, t (30) =
2.14, p = .041.
Implicit Self-Activation
There did not appear to be any differences between groups (see Table 1) on
the signature size measure on day three (t (30) = .772, p = .46).
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CHAPTER 5
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS,
AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Discussion of Results
The purpose of the present study was to provide an initial test of the recently
proposed ―self-invoking trigger‖ hypothesis by manipulating self-activation during
practice in a straightforward manner. While practicing a challenging motor skill –
wiffleball hitting – participants in the experimental condition were asked to write
about themselves between trial blocks. Following each of two practice sessions,
two measures of explicit self-activation (cognitive and somatic) were
administered, as well as a measure of implicit self-activation (change in signature
size). During a third session, participants were asked to perform a retention test
of the hitting task they had practiced without the intermittent writing task they
completed during practice. Subsequent to the retention test, participants were
asked to perform a more challenging transfer task (hit balls pitched at a faster
velocity) to assess the generalizability of their motor skill learning. Finally,
participants were administered the two explicit measures and one implicit
measure of self-activation before terminating participation in the study. The
prediction that participants in the experimental condition would score higher on
measures of self-activation and lower on measures of motor performance and
learning were partially supported. The failure to support all hypotheses may
have been due to insufficient sample size, the use of measures that assess a
slightly different construct than what was affected by the experimental
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manipulation, and a potentially confounding effect of motor performance in
between the administration of the experimental manipulation and the
measurement of its effects.
Hitting Performance
Both groups demonstrated significant improvement in wiffleball hitting across
practice blocks, while there was a trend for the self group to perform less
effectively during the practice phase of the study. On the retention test, the self
group performed significantly less effectively than the control group.
Interestingly, there was evidence that the self group continued to improve across
the retention blocks while the control group appeared to plateau. This may
indicate that the control group was able to reach a level of relatively stable
performance on the task after two days of practice, while the self group, possibly
hindered by the self-activating manipulation, still had room to improve on the third
day. The self group tended to perform less effectively on the transfer task as
well, indicating a lack of ability to generalize to the more challenging task.
Explicit Self-Activation
On the measure of cognitive self-activation, the self group tended to report
higher levels of self-activation, as predicted. However, the group differences did
not reach significance, possibly because of inadequate sample size. Further, the
timing of the measure’s assessment may have negatively affected its sensitivity
to group differences caused by the experimental manipulation. Since
participants performed a block of 10 trials between the last writing manipulation
of each session and the administration of the questionnaire, it is possible that
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―self-invoking triggers‖ present in the hitting task (e.g., swings and misses)
blurred group differences in self-activation caused by the manipulation.
Interestingly and unexpectedly, both groups reported less cognitive selfactivation on the second practice session than on the first. There are at least two
possible reasons for this change: first, it is possible that the reduction in selfactivation was caused by the general increase in performance by both groups.
Since errors have been found to induce self-activation (Van Dyck et al., 2010), it
is possible that the general reduction in errors experienced on the second day of
practice is responsible for the overall reporting of less self-activation. A second
possibility is that the participants in both groups were more comfortable with the
research setting (i.e., the laboratory, the task, the experimenter) on the second
day, resulting in a general reduction in self-activation.
The results of the somatic measure of explicit self-activation were similar to
the cognitive measure during practice in that they significantly decreased on the
second day. The group differences were in the opposite direction of the research
hypothesis though, as the control group tended to report greater somatic selfactivation than the self group on each day. This difference was not significant
during practice, but did reach significance during retention. The etiology of this
effect is difficult to explain. However, there are a couple strong reasons for
refraining from interpreting this finding as evidence of greater self-activation in
the control group: first, the measure assessed participants’ reported experience
of somatic symptoms of anxiety and self-consciousness. Many of these
symptoms are also consistent with moderate levels of physical activity. For
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example, two items ask participants to indicate their level of agreement with the
statements ―My heart beat faster,‖ and ―I perspired.‖ Full agreement with these
two items would be expected from some participants after just finishing 50 to 70
swings, and would also result in an above average score even if the remaining
items were answered with a one. Second, the self group indicated greater
cognitive self-activation than the control group, a measure much closer to the
conception of self-activation implicated in the ―self-invoking trigger‖ hypothesis.
Since it is a strong possibility that the somatic measure of self-activation was
influenced by motor performance between experimental manipulation and its
assessment, and since the measure of cognitive self-activation was in the
predicted direction, it seems an unlikely scenario that the control group
experienced greater self-activation than the self group throughout the study.
Implicit Self-Activation
There were no significant changes in signature size measured in this study.
While previous research has demonstrated that change in signature size is a
reliable measure of threats to the self (Rudman, Dohn, & Fairchild, 2007; Stapel
& Blanton, 2004), the present study did not aim to threaten the self, necessarily.
Instead, the goal of the experimental manipulation was simply to activate the selfschema, a process that may not impact signature size alone. Still, it seemed
likely that there would be some degree of threat to the self experienced by the
self group, and the failure to find such an effect may be due to at least two
reasons: first, signing a signature requires fine motor control that could possibly
have been impacted by the preceding physical activity. Since both groups
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signed larger signatures than their baseline at the end of each day, it is possible
that hitting wiffleballs immediately prior to signing a signature somewhat
degrades handwriting performance, producing both larger and potentially more
variable signatures and thus masking any self-activation effects. A comparison
of the standard deviations found in this study with those reported by Rudman and
colleagues (2007) reveals that there was 20 to 40 percent greater variability in
signatures collected in this study. This comparison offers some support to the
contention that the hitting task in this study may have caused some error in the
signature size measure. A second possible reason for the failure to find an effect
on signature size is the testing of a sample made up mostly of people who played
baseball or softball in the past, but who have not played in years and thus do not
consider ―hitter‖ as a major part of their identity. Since signature size typically
measures a threat to some aspect of the self, if ―hitter‖ is not part of a
participant’s conception of self then signature size may not have been the
appropriate measure for the effect of the manipulation employed in this study.
Conclusions and Recommendations
For Further Study
The present study provides initial support for the ―self-invoking trigger‖
hypothesis. A strength of the design is that one could have reasonably predicted
a priori that the self group would perform more effectively than a control group.
After all, as one participant commented, reminding someone of their ―glory days‖
could have boosted confidence or activated forgotten movement patterns.
Instead, the ostensibly innocuous activity of contemplating one’s own
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experiences, emotions, strengths, weakness, and attributes seemed to activate a
lurking neural self-network that interfered with the process of motor learning.
This initial test provides preliminary evidence that self-activation is detrimental to
motor learning and performance, but replication is necessary to confirm the
existence of the self-activation effect and improved methodology is necessary to
shed light on the underpinning etiology.
One key limitation of the present study was its inability to measure selfactivation or test for its possible mediating effect. Future studies must address
two key issues in endeavoring to measure a mediating effect of self-activation on
motor learning degradation: determining the appropriate tool to measure the
specific phenomenon responsible for the self-activation effect, and ensuring that
said tool can be administered prior to practice or performance without causing
self-activation. The present study was unable to measure differences in selfactivation caused by the experimental manipulation, although it seems the
measure of cognitive self-activation employed may have been effective with a
larger sample. That said, it seems unlikely the measure used in this study could
be used to evaluate a mediating effect of self-activation because the completion
of the measure by a participant is likely to result in self-activation. This is an
issue that will likely plague any explicit measure of self-activation. Since the
implicit measure employed in this study was unsuccessful as well, it seems
another direction would be appropriate. A lexical decision task has been used to
successfully measure self-activation implicitly and with a sample size similar to
the present study (N = 36; Hall & Crisp, 2010). Further, there is some face
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validity to the way a lexical decision task measures self-activation (by
determining if self-related words are recognized preferentially quick relative to
non-self words) with regards to the way the self was ostensibly activated in the
present study. An implicit measure like a lexical decision task could be assessed
immediately following the experimental manipulation but before motor
performance without concern for the measure itself causing self-activation. If an
explicit measure (such as the one used in this study) is employed, a variant of
the Solomon four group design might be appropriate to control for the possible
effects of measuring self-activation.
While reliably measuring self-activation (and its possible mediating effect) is
an essential step in the study of the ―self-invoking trigger,‖ it does not bring us
any closer to understanding why self-activation is detrimental to motor learning
and performance. There are at least three potential mechanisms for the selfactivation effect: competition for cognitive resources (Wulf & Lewthwaite, 2010),
self-activation leads to an internal focus (the inverse of the original explanation,
not yet ruled out), and self-activation leads to reinvestment of explicit rules
(Masters, 1992; 1993). A replication of Gray (2004; Experiment 2) with the
experimental manipulations used in the present study and an opportunity to list
as many explicit rules as possible at the end of the study would likely rule out at
least one of the possible explanations. The extraneous dual-task would test the
competition for cognitive resources hypothesis; the skill-focused dual-task would
test the self-activation leads to an internal focus hypothesis; and the opportunity
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to list explicit rules would determine if self-activation causes participants to
access their declarative knowledge-base associated with hitting performance.
It seems to me that the above suggestions are the next logical steps towards
understanding the possible self-activation effect discovered in the present study.
Once the results of the above studies are known, it may be possible to determine
the extent to which the self-invoking trigger is responsible for other patterns of
findings beyond the attentional focus literature. At this point, one must be
cautious in interpreting the present findings. This study was the first of its kind,
and replication (perhaps with the methods described above) is essential before
one may draw any firm conclusions.
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APPENDIX 1
COGNITIVE SELF-ACTIVATION SCALE

Strongly disagree
1
2

3

4

5

6

Strongly Agree
7

1. I have the sense that the experimenter was psychoanalyzing my motives and
me.
2. I think the experimenter knew what I am thinking and feeling.
3. I think the experimenter watched all my body movements, gestures, and reactions.
4. I think the experimenter scrutinized my every move and payed attention to every detail.
5. I noticed the experimenter saw through me.
6. I think that the experimenter saw me as an incomplete and inadequate hitter.
7. I think that the experimenter considered me to be a failure as a hitter.
8. I tended to avoid eye contact with the experimenter.
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APPENDIX 2
SOMATIC SELF-ACTIVATION SCALE
Strongly disagree
1

Strongly Agree
2

3

4

Scale 2
1. I felt jittery in my body.
2. My heart beat faster.
3. I felt a bit physically weak.
4. I felt tense in my stomach.
5. I perspired.
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5

6

7

APPENDIX 3
SELF-ACTIVATING MANIPULATION

1. Please write continuously for 1 minute about your own personal
experience participating in baseball or softball. The experimenter will time
you.

2. Please write continuously for 1 minute about your strengths and
weaknesses as a hitter. Give examples from personal experience. The
experimenter will time you.

3. Please describe your emotional response to baseball or softball. How has
performing in baseball or softball made you feel in the past? Please write
for 1 minute- the experimenter will time you.

4. Please describe your own physical attributes and how they have helped or
hindered your athletic performance in the past. Please write continuously
for 1 minute while the experimenter times you.
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APPENDIX 4
CONTROL MANIPULATION
1. Please list every item you can see in the laboratory from largest to
smallest. The experimenter will ask you to stop after 1 minute.

2. Please list every item in the room alphabetically, beginning with the letter
A. The experimenter will ask you to stop after 1 minute.

3. Please list every item in the room by color; list as many blue objects as
possible, then as many red, then as many black, then as many yellow.
The experimenter will ask you to stop after 1 minute.

4. Please list every item in the room by shape: list the items with straight
edges first, then the items that are curved, and finally list any irregularly
shaped items. The experimenter will ask you to stop after 1 minute.

APPENDIX 5
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CONTENT OF SELF MANIPULATION
Participants in the self group wrote overwhelmingly positive responses to the first
question of the manipulation. Typical positive answers recalled enjoying baseball
or softball, spending time with family and friends, and being successful at the
game. Some of the negative responses included losing interest, finding the
game boring or slow, and enduring injury.

Although item two on the self manipulation asked for strengths and weaknesses,
almost all participants wrote the majority of their response about their personal
strengths as a hitter.

Response to the third item of the self questionnaire was unanimously positive as
everyone cited having fun with the sport and enjoying their time in the game.

Similar to the second item, response to the final question on the self manipulation
was predominately positive, although participants were asked to include negative
attributes as well. Typically, participants would list 2 or 3 strengths for every one
weakness.
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